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GREENING INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT 
DANIEL B. MAGRAW* 
SERGIO PUIG** 
Abstract: Climate change poses serious threats to human society. Climate 
change is already affecting our environment and thus, many aspects of human 
and economic activity. Among the challenges ahead, governments will need to 
more actively adopt regulatory policies given the international obligations in 
this area, such as the Paris Agreement, as well as promote green private invest-
ment as a means toward unlocking sustainable growth. How can international 
investment law be adapted and modernized to respond to these challenges? In 
this Essay, we summarize a comprehensive set of innovations that could be in-
cluded in International Investment Agreements to address international obliga-
tions regarding climate change. Our discussion, based on a Green Treaty Model, 
first stresses the role of balanced obligations for investors and host countries, 
and then focuses on dispute settlement. We conclude by explaining how the cur-
rent process of reform under the auspices of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law can be used for a more ambitious transformation of in-
ternational investment; a transformation in which investment treaties can act as 
catalysts for green foreign direct investment necessary to reverse the momentum 
for climate change already built into the atmosphere. 
INTRODUCTION 
Global climate is already changing our environment. Glaciers have 
shrunk, ice on rivers and lakes is melting earlier, plant and animal ranges 
have shifted, and trees are flowering sooner. Wildfires are more frequent, hur-
ricanes more intense, and periods of drought and heat waves more prolonged. 
These trends harm crops in the fields as changes in daily and seasonal weath-
er disruptions increase, which may affect growing patterns and increase the 
need for irrigation and other water management techniques. Climate change 
will affect growing patterns and increase the need for irrigation and other wa-
ter management techniques. This will affect our food supply and will impact 
our daily life in unpredictable ways. Adaptation will be required; and efforts 
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to mitigate climate change will also affect our lives, as “virtually every hu-
man activity directly or indirectly emits [greenhouse gases] . . . .”1 In short, 
“[t]he planet’s atmosphere is a public good, and climate change constitutes a 
public bad.”2 
To minimize the impacts of these effects, it is necessary to implement 
climate-friendly investment laws and policies to incentivize green invest-
ments—both domestic, and perhaps more importantly, foreign. And yet, 
most treaties addressing transnational fluxes of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) make little to no effort to reflect this necessity, let alone highlight the 
potential of FDI for improving these disheartening prospects. It is widely 
recognized that optimally regulated FDI has the potential to mitigate this 
public bad and generate substantial economic and environmental enhance-
ments through the establishment of more efficient supply chains and the 
dissemination of good practices.3 These are indirect benefits for combatting 
climate change. But, in addition to failing to provide the space to deal with 
climate change-induced regulatory needs, perhaps the main blind spot of 
international investment agreements (IIAs) is neglecting the fact that FDI 
can also generate direct benefits, including with respect to combatting cli-
mate change through technology transfer and innovation to emerging mar-
ket economies.4  
                                                                                                                           
 1 Jonathan B. Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Con-
text, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 692 (1999); see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE SCI-
ENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOME KEY QUESTIONS 10–11 (2001) [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE 
SCIENCE]; Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354, 
44,402–03 (proposed July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1) (describing greenhouse 
gases attributable to diverse human activities such as electricity, heating, cooking, transportation, 
landfills, mining, industry, soil management, land use change, and raising domesticated animals). 
 2 Rachel Brewster, Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block: Incrementalism and National Climate 
Change Legislation, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 245, 268 (2010); see Jody Freeman & Andrew 
Guzman, Climate Change and U.S. Interests, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1596 (2009) (discussing 
the implications of economic interests relating to climate change). 
 3 See JOSEPH FRANCOIS ET AL., CTR. FOR ECON. POLICY RESEARCH, REDUCING TRANSAT-
LANTIC BARRIERS TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT: AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 1–3 (2013), http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/march/tradoc_150737.pdf [https://perma.cc/FA6U-MZV9] 
(arguing that “domestic rules and regulations . . . can place a cost on trade and investment” but 
that “the costs involved may . . . be mitigated or reduced through partial regulatory convergence 
and cross-recognition of standards”). See generally Peter John Wood, Climate Change and Game 
Theory: A Mathematical Survey (Austl. Nat’l Univ. Crawford Sch. Econ. & Gov’t, Working Paper 
No. 2.10, 2010), http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/249379/2/CCEP-2-10.pdf [https://perma.
cc/556S-4JUC] (discussing game theoretic solutions to climate change); CLIMATE CHANGE SCI-
ENCE, supra note 1. 
 4 See, e.g., HOWARD MANN & KONRAD VON MOLTKE, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., 
NAFTA’S CHAPTER 11 AND THE ENVIRONMENT: ADDRESSING THE IMPACTS OF THE INVESTOR-
STATE PROCESS ON THE ENVIRONMENT 3–4 (1999), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/nafta.pdf [https://
perma.cc/MYU5-G4ZZ]; Thomas Waelde & Abba Kolo, Environmental Regulation, Investment 
Protection and ‘Regulatory Taking’ in International Law, 50 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 811, 814, 822 
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To reap the full potential of environmental benefits from these FDI in-
flows, adequate host country legal, technical, and regulatory capacities and 
appropriate IIAs will be needed. What is perplexing then is the failure of IIAs 
to take climate change into account. Climate change presents unique uncer-
tainties and other challenges to investors and to governments, particularly for 
long-term investments. The effects of climate change can be highly disruptive 
to economic and other human activity, in part because those effects are un-
predictable at the local level, and in part because the international community 
and host countries need to continually readjust climate change-related poli-
cies. Thus, investors and governments should work together more actively to 
enhance regulatory policies with international obligations in this area.5 Pub-
lic-private partnerships are particularly fundamental to increasing energy effi-
ciency for providing both new financial opportunities and enhanced environ-
mental security. Green private investment is further acknowledged as being a 
means toward unlocking sustainable growth.6 
How can IIAs incentivize FDI and host countries to deal with climate 
change? In this Essay, we discuss some innovations that could be included 
in future IIAs, to make these agreements more responsive to the challenges 
presented by climate change. The Essay is based on the work of a constitu-
tive group of experts who participated in designing a ‘Green Investment 
Treaty Model’ (“Green Treaty” or “Treaty”) as part of a challenge created 
by the Stockholm Treaty Lab.7 This Essay highlights some of the team’s 
main suggestions in the spirit of expanding the audience for this issue and 
engaging the community of international investment law scholars who may 
not be aware of the relevant intersection between FDI and climate change.8 
                                                                                                                           
(2001) (discussing tensions between international environmental and international investment 
law); Alan Morrison, Is the Trans-Pacific Partnership Unconstitutional?, THE ATLANTIC (Jun. 23, 
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/tpp-isds-constitution/396389/ [https://
perma.cc/RGL3-C3FS] (discussing the tension between international investment arbitration and 
the demands of the United States Constitution). 
 5 For an example of an international agreement with climate change-related obligations, see 
Environment Agreement Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Apr. 22, 2016, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 [hereinafter The Paris Agreement]. 
 6 GREEN GROWTH ACTION ALL., THE GREEN INVESTMENT REPORT 6 (2013), http://www3.
weforum.org/docs/WEF_GreenInvestment_Report_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AV8-FL9N]. 
 7 See generally The Inspiration, STOCKHOLM TREATY LAB, http://stockholmtreatylab.org/the-
treaty-lab/ [https://perma.cc/G49P-KHX7] (discussing the Stockholm Treaty Lab Prize and its 
challenge to draft a model investment treaty for climate change mitigation). 
 8 Daniel B. Magraw et al., Model Green Investment Treaty: Team Planet Submission (2018), 
http://stockholmtreatylab.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Team-13-Model-Treaty.pdf [https://perma.
cc/2DTB-Q8HH] [hereinafter Green Treaty: Team Planet]. The team was composed of the fol-
lowing experts: Krycia Cowling, Charles Di Leva, Jonathan Drimmer, Chiara Giorgetti, Hana 
Heineken, Mette Hoej, Young-Hee Lee, Leila Chennoufi, Jan Low, Daniel Magraw, Kendra Ma-
graw, Steve McCaffrey, Grace Menck Figueroa, Sergio Puig, Annabella Rosemberg, and Niranjali 
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Before continuing, a clarification is in order: because space precludes 
addressing all the investment-related topics implicated in climate change, 
we focus on dispute settlement provisions. Not only does the symposium 
organized by Boston College have a narrower focus on investment dispute 
settlement, but the current process of reform undertaken under the auspices 
of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UN-
CITRAL) centers primarily on how to improve or transform investor-State 
dispute settlement (ISDS), the controversial yet dominant process of enforc-
ing international investment commitments.9 Hence, this Essay briefly notes 
some of the proposals to make IIAs more consistent and compatible with 
climate change’s challenges, and addresses the main changes that could be 
implemented with respect to dispute settlement.10 
The Essay is organized as follows: Part I addresses the main substan-
tive proposals, discussing some of the criteria used in the design of the 
Green Treaty.11 Part II explains the relevance of investment dispute settle-
ment for the effective implementation of the Green Treaty as well as the 
necessary adaptation to the dominant paradigm of investment dispute set-
tlement—ISDS.12 Finally, we briefly conclude. 
                                                                                                                           
Amerasinghe. We must add that other teams participated in the Stockholm Treaty Lab’s competi-
tion and that our proposal was not judged to be the winner. See The Outcome, STOCKHOLM TREA-
TY LAB, http://stockholmtreatylab.org/the-outcome/ [https://perma.cc/925D-YFRX]. 
 9 Mattias Kumm, An Empire of Capital? Transatlantic Investment Protection as the Institution-
alization of Unjustified Privilege, 4 ESIL REFLECTION 3 (2015). See generally GUS VAN HARTEN, 
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007) (discussing the implications of in-
vestment treaty arbitration as a public law system and the unique power of private arbitrators within 
the system). For controversial ISDS cases, see Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Austl., 
PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Jan. 7, 2015) http://www.italaw.
com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7303_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GPT-AJYH], and 
Vattenfall AB v. Fed. Republic of Ger., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6, Claimant’s Request for Arbi-
tration (Mar. 30, 2009), http://italaw.com/documents/Vattenfall_Request_for_Arbitration_001.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QW72-LLLR]. 
 10 By doing so, we do not ignore the realities that climate change affects virtually all aspects 
of society and that some countries and segments of society are more likely to be involved in other 
important ways. We, however, want to link the important work on greening FDI to the current and 
historical process of ISDS reform that is being advanced within UNCITRAL, without dismissing 
important substantive innovations proposed by this group of experts. See, e.g., Anthea Roberts, 
Incremental, Systemic, and Paradigmatic Reform of Investor-State Arbitration, 112 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 410 (2018) (providing an overview of different reform proposals) [hereinafter Roberts, Reform 
of Investor-State Arbitration]. 
 11 See infra notes 13–35, and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 36–68, and accompanying text. 
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I. TOWARDS A GREEN INVESTMENT TREATY 
Given the nature and significance of challenges posed by climate 
change, governments should adapt their IIAs in a nuanced way to address 
what are likely to be the most important areas, activities and issues for regu-
lating FDI. In this section, we briefly highlight some of the more substan-
tive aspects of how IIAs can become more responsive to the challenges pre-
sented by climate change. 
A. Incentivizing Green FDI 
As is evident from the Green Treaty—a model agreement that we hope 
will inspire governments across the globe—we believe policymakers should 
design IIAs to fill the currently existing vacuum by integrating investment 
and climate change laws and policies within the framework of sustainable 
development.13 For that purpose, the structure of our proposal for a Green 
Treaty retains the form of a traditional IIA, i.e., an international treaty, ad-
dressing investment-related disciplines with a preamble, operative provisions, 
final clauses, and annexes.14 Substantively, States should re-conceptualize 
fundamental aspects of investment law to take account of the specific chal-
lenges posed by climate change to investors, society, and governments in 
general and to capitalize on the experience gained with traditional IIAs, in-
cluding at least two decades of intense dispute settlement practice. This 
practice has given rise to important doctrinal issues as well as ample inter-
pretive guidance by ISDS tribunals. 
On that basis, and with the benefit of years of experience in different 
relevant fields of law and policy, the team proposed a treaty text with em-
bedded flexibilities for IIAs that could be adopted by different nations. 
Many of the Treaty’s provisions are more-or-less standard and draw on lan-
                                                                                                                           
 13 Many changes and new model treaties have emerged from ISDS criticism. For example, 
South Africa suspended negotiations of investment treaties. See, e.g., Republic of South Africa, 
Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy Framework Review: Government Position Paper 12, 12 (2009), 
http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/docs/090626trade-bi-lateralpolicy.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H8WM-SUYD]; Luke Eric Peterson, South Africa Pushes Phase-Out of Early 
Bilateral Investment Treaties After at Least Two Separate Brushes with Investor-State Arbitration, 
INVESTMENT ARB. REP. (Sept. 23, 2012), http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20120924_1. Other 
countries have imposed new restrictions in their draft investment-related treaties. See Agreement 
Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area art. 27(2), Feb. 27, 2009, 2672 
U.N.T.S. 47529; Damon Vis-Dunbar, Norway Shelves Its Draft Model Bilateral Investment Trea-
ty, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV.: INV. TREATY NEWS (June 8, 2009), https://www.iisd.org/
itn/2009/06/08/norway-shelves-its-proposed-model-bilateral-investment-treaty/ [https://perma.cc/
U2QE-89TM]. Nevertheless, to our knowledge this is the first exercise to reform an entire IIA 
with the aim of confronting climate change. 
 14 See generally Green Treaty: Team Planet, supra note 8. 
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guage from already existing investment agreements such as the Canada-
European Union Trade Agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, in part 
to avoid unnecessary questions of interpretation.15 The team concluded that 
nations should embody innovations at several levels to support the Paris 
Agreement on Climate Change16 and sustainable development by including 
legal provisions aimed at:  
• approaching the critical need to protect the parties’ right to regulate 
not only with general statements but also with express attention to 
sectoral areas of particular relevance to climate change, such as in-
centives, water, agriculture, land use, energy, public health, labor, 
human rights, indigenous people’s rights, and finance;17 
• providing balance in obligations by including disputable investor 
obligations, including with respect to planning, implementation, 
and reporting;18 
• crafting obligations to fit the context of climate change by including 
all the usual IIA disciplines except the prohibition on performance 
requirements because addressing climate change may require the 
latter, particularly with respect to agriculture or energy use;19 
• emphasizing the importance of sound planning by investors, which 
includes requiring environmental impact assessments to take into 
account climate risks; setting up compliance programs to ensure 
proper governance; and, developing an environmental management 
program to ensure investments do not stray from a climate-friendly 
path;20 
• focusing on the full lifetime of investments to ensure planning and 
implementation that support the host country’s efforts to address 
climate change, with enforceability being an indispensable part of a 
multipronged approach designed to achieve effective implementa-
tion;21 
• specifying and integrating investment reporting and party reporting 
requirements under the Paris Agreement, such as providing for a 
transparent and participatory process involving foreign investments 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See Joint Interpretative Instrument on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA) between Canada and the European Union and its Member States, Jan. 14, 2017, 2017 O.J. 
(L 11) 3 [hereinafter Joint Interpretive Instrument]; Green Treaty: Team Planet, supra note 8. 
 16 See The Paris Agreement, supra note 5; Green Treaty: Team Planet, supra note 8, art. 5. 
 17 Green Treaty: Team Planet, supra note 8, arts. 8–17. 
 18 Id. art. 35. 
 19 Id. arts. 35–36. 
 20 Id. art. 35.  
 21 See generally id. 
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for the Paris Agreement’s five-year cycle of adjusting Nationally 
Determined Contributions;22 
• emphasizing the importance of education, capacity building, tech-
nology transfer and finance, including means of monitoring and re-
porting on climate change-related educational efforts;23 
• requiring transparency with respect to promulgating and publishing 
climate-related measures, including subsidies and other incentives 
or disincentives, and about international dispute settlement;24 
• specifying a balanced treatment of allegations of corruption that 
embodies proper incentives to both investors and parties;25 
• encouraging cooperation between parties and between parties and 
foreign investors in the event of natural disasters, which will be ex-
acerbated by climate change;26 and 
• providing flexibility regarding dispute settlement, as well as 
strengthening and adding credibility to climate change-related dis-
pute settlement.27 
Some of the proposed text for each of the obligations that implement 
these innovations might be seen as favoring investors and investments, 
while others may be seen as favoring State parties to the agreement. We 
believe, however, that the entire package of provisions comprises an inte-
grated and balanced approach. The main goals of this proposed Treaty in-
clude balancing the right to regulate with the need to encourage sound for-
eign investment in the context of combating climate change and achieving 
sustainable development. Such balancing can be difficult in practice, espe-
cially when deciding fact-intensive questions. Hence, we recognize the fun-
damental role of dispute settlement provisions that can empower different 
types of adjudicators to contextualize what are often perceived as broad le-
gal standards.28 
                                                                                                                           
 22 Id. art. 26. 
 23 Id. pmbl. 
 24 Id. art. 30. 
 25 Id. art. 16. 
 26 Id. arts. 5, 23. 
 27 Daniel B. Magraw et al., Model Investment Green Treaty: Executive Summary (2018) (on 
file with author) [hereinafter Green Treaty: Executive Summary]. See generally Green Treaty: 
Team Planet, supra note 8. 
 28 Suzanne A. Spears, The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation of International Invest-
ment Agreements, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 1037, 1071 (2010) (arguing that tribunals are increasingly 
engaged in a “balancing process” and are “called upon to make value judgments”). Treaties have not 
failed to recognize this trend. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State, 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment 
Treaty arts. 24(3), 37, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Y6L4-HHHP]. 
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B. Maximizing Intersectionality and Feasibility 
To correctly contextualize investment provisions within climate change 
challenges, IIAs should maximize intersectionality among all relevant legal 
fields, including environmental, investment promotion and protection, water, 
and indigenous rights. In addition, drafters should ensure that the treaty provi-
sions are meaningful and relevant for regulatory and investment decisions 
alike. The Green Treaty accomplishes this by containing a set of parallel obli-
gations and carving out the necessary policy space for regulators. This ap-
proach minimizes the demands placed on adjudicators by providing guidance 
to them.29 The balancing of values and priorities is best addressed by demo-
cratic processes or by authorities with better information and contact with 
relevant actors.30 In this spirit, and in accordance with the criteria announced 
for the competition, we proposed an integrated, comprehensive approach with 
the following characteristics: 
• Compatibility: The team’s approach is compatible with other 
areas of law. Importantly, the sectoral approach to ensuring the 
parties’ right to regulate takes express account of activities and 
areas of particular relevance to climate change, such as agri-
culture, water and finance.31 
• Efficiency: The team’s design aims to attract investment in 
general, with special consideration for green investment. The 
requirement that parties be transparent with respect to the 
promulgation and enactment of subsidies, incentives and dis-
incentives and regarding other investment-related measures al-
lows investors and investments to better understand what is 
happening, and may lead to more rational decision-making.32 
• Viability: The team proposes strong, precise protection of the 
right to regulate, including through the sectoral approach and 
the preclusion of the prohibition on performance requirements, 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See, e.g., Meredith Wilensky, Reconciling International Investment Law and Climate 
Change Policy: Potential Liability for Climate Measures Under the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 45 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,683, 10,689 (2015) (discussing the broad application of the Fair and Equitable 
Treatment standard and innovations in the TPP to reduce misapplications in the context of climate 
change policy). 
 30 See Kyla Tienhaara, Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration: A View from Political 
Science, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 606, 606 (Chester 
Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011) (arguing that regulatory chill may be an important problem “in-
adequately addressed and often prematurely dismissed by legal scholars”). 
 31 Green Treaty: Executive Summary, supra note 27, at 3. See generally Green Treaty: Team 
Planet, supra note 8. 
 32 Green Treaty: Executive Summary, supra note 27, at 4. See generally Green Treaty: Team 
Planet, supra note 8. 
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to serve States’ needs but at the same time remain attractive to 
investors. The chosen sectors, such as agriculture and water, 
are likely to be critically important to many States as climate 
change affects, for example, the availability and quality of wa-
ter.33 
• Universality: A defining characteristic of the proposal is the 
overall balance of the Treaty, which is achieved by a blend of 
the elements summarized above. This allows countries with 
varying views on that subject to effectively engage with the 
framework. States can deal with perhaps the most contentious 
issues, including regulating fossil fuels or mining, in the way 
that best suits them.34 
• Enforceability: As we further explain below, by providing dif-
ferent alternative modes of dispute settlement, countries may 
select a method that best meets their needs; which can lead to 
better implementation and ultimately enforcement, if the need 
for it arises.35 
It suffices to say here that most of the proposals to improve IIAs in-
clude provisions dovetailing with each other to attain comprehensiveness 
and balance. Massive capital flows, carefully planned and implemented pro-
jects, and international cooperation and coordination are needed to address 
climate change. In this sense, the greening of IIAs is a necessary step for 
building a more prosperous tomorrow for present and future generations. 
II. THE ROLE OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
A key part of transforming IIAs is to provide flexibility regarding dis-
pute settlement to countries with different views regarding who should decide 
investment disputes, as well as adequate safeguards if ISDS is elected. The 
proposal thus contains three alternative methods of dispute settlement: do-
mestic courts of the host country, traditional ISDS, and a standing tribunal. It 
allows prospective signatories to an IIA to choose among those different op-
                                                                                                                           
 33 Green Treaty: Executive Summary, supra note 27, at 5. See generally Green Treaty: Team 
Planet, supra note 8. 
 34 Green Treaty: Executive Summary, supra note 27, at 6. See generally Green Treaty: Team 
Planet, supra note 8. 
 35 Green Treaty: Executive Summary, supra note 27, at 7. See generally Sergio Puig & Grego-
ry Shaffer, Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the Reform of Investment Law, 112 
AM. J. INT’L L. 361 (2018) (discussing ways to assess alternatives in investment law); Green 
Treaty: Team Planet, supra note 8.  
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tions. This approach is consistent with that of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea in connection with disputes brought under it.36 
Flexibility alone is not sufficient. Greener IIAs must be complemented 
by strengthening and adding credibility to climate change-related dispute 
settlements. The Green Treaty contains five provisions addressing this is-
sue. First, it requires that cases be decided expeditiously and with due pro-
cess if the Parties choose to settle investor-initiated disputes in domestic 
courts of the host country.37 Second, the Green Treaty requires that arbitra-
tors have a basic familiarity with climate change law and sustainable devel-
opment law and policy, requirements that do not exist in any IIA and are 
essential to reaching just results, if the parties choose either of the interna-
tional dispute settlement mechanisms.38 Third, the Treaty contains a manda-
tory Code of Conduct appropriate for international disputes brought under 
the IIA.39 Fourth, the Treaty requires that dispute settlement be transparent 
and provide meaningful opportunity for public participation, and more spe-
cifically, that dispute settlement under either of the international mecha-
nisms be conducted in accord with the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency 
in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration.40 And fifth, parties are implicitly 
required to report publicly on compliance with treaty-based decisions or 
awards.41 
We briefly describe below the three alternatives and the reason for our 
position. We also explain some other innovations that can be added to in-
vestment dispute settlement, in particular ISDS, to bring enforcement more 
in line with the goals of the Green Treaty. 
A. The Need for Alternatives 
Many analysts have addressed whether ISDS, a permanent court, or 
domestic courts are preferable as alternatives for handling claims regarding 
unfair, discriminatory, or expropriatory treatment of foreign investments.42 
The analysis, however, should also include non-adjudicatory mechanisms 
such as private contracting, and political risk insurance as well as political 
mechanisms, such as international diplomacy. A country’s decision should 
be made by the country itself based on its own conditions. 
                                                                                                                           
 36 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 287, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
397.  
 37 Green Treaty: Team Planet, supra note 8, art. 38-A-1. 
 38 Id. art. 39. 
 39 Id. annex 38-B-1/38-C-1. 
 40 Id. art. 38. 
 41 Id. art. 28. 
 42 Id. 
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Institutional choice is always contextual and thus all institutional op-
tions are imperfect and subject to trade-offs.43 Market options may not be 
available in many situations, especially for small- and medium-sized inves-
tors. Domestic courts may not be independent or impartial, lacking basic 
rule-of-law protections. Some may be more prone to biases against foreign-
ers. Diplomacy tends to favor powerful States, as well as the influential 
firms that lobby them. Interstate dispute settlement can politicize disputes 
and still be tilted in favor of powerful actors, whether they be States or large 
corporations with privileged access to State officials. 
To decide which institutional option is preferable, one should not 
simply aggregate how an institutional option performs across goals.44 But if 
States aim at enhancing climate change regulation within the domestic rule 
of law, then States may want to put emphasis on domestic courts and insti-
tutions. Complementarity between domestic and international dispute set-
tlement is an important goal of international law, an attribute the current 
ISDS system does not yet prioritize. From this perspective, national courts 
should be the first in line for resolving disputes and mechanisms that pro-
vide incentives for domestic rule-of-law enhancement.45 
But some countries may not need to emphasize domestic rule of law or 
prioritize other considerations and hence may choose an international invest-
ment dispute settlement mechanism. The most frequently used mechanism for 
investment adjudication—ISDS—has many deficiencies that commentators 
have identified for decades.46 For example, ISDS creates structural incentives 
for arbitrators to favor those who appoint them. There is no appeals mecha-
nism to provide for consistency across cases, raising basic rule-of-law con-
cerns. Inconsistent decisions made by ad hoc panels limit the law’s expressive 
value, and therefore, the law’s influence on behavior outside the threat of 
                                                                                                                           
 43 See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN 
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994) (arguing that all legal and policy questions need 
consideration of the comparative capabilities of different institutions and providing comparative 
institutional analysis framework). 
 44 See generally Puig & Shaffer, supra note 35. 
 45 CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. LAW, POSITION PAPER: EU PROPOSAL FOR A MULTILATERAL 
REFORM OF INVESTMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION 5 (2017) (criticizing the ICS proposal for “allow-
ing investors to side step” domestic courts). 
 46 See generally THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND 
REALITY (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010) (presenting some of the systemic concerns with in-
vestment arbitration, such as limitations on domestic policy space, a lack of democratic accounta-
bility, a systemic pro-investor bias, and the inability of treaties to respond to changes in economic 
circumstances). 
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sanctions. Hence, as we explain below, if this option is chosen, IIAs may add 
safeguards to offset the general shortcomings of ISDS.47 
A third option involves an international court system (ICS). The idea 
of a single court was advanced as a more legitimate alternative than ISDS 
by the European Commission.48 At its core, this proposal would create a 
tribunal of first instance and an appellate body, with the judges having fixed 
terms, paid a regular salary, and selected on a random basis from a roster 
designated by States. These judges would be restricted from acting as coun-
sel in other cases (which in our judgment occurs too often under current 
IIAs). The European Commission, representing the twenty-eight member 
States of the European Union (E.U.), has endorsed this option, and even 
included it in several agreements. The E.U. plans to promote ICS prospec-
tively in all its treaty negotiations involving investment protection, includ-
ing with the United States under the proposed Transatlantic Trade and In-
vestment Partnership (TTIP).49 As the world’s largest sender and receiver of 
                                                                                                                           
 47 Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty 
System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45, 91–92 (2013) (discussing criticism of ISDS and proposing a new 
theoretical framework to explain the investment treaty system) [hereinafter Roberts, Clash of 
Paradigms]. 
 48 LAURA PUCCIO & RODERICK HARTE, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERV., FROM 
ARBITRATION TO THE INVESTMENT COURT SYSTEM (ICS) 13–15 (2017), http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/607251/EPRS_IDA(2017)607251_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/
93F4-Z44Y]; see U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Set-
tlement Reform), Submission from the European Union for the 35th Sess., Possible Reform of Inves-
tor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), at 2–3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.145 (Dec. 12, 2017), 
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/V17/088/32/pdf/V1708832.pdf?OpenElement 
[https://perma.cc/J4RR-4S5N] (providing critiques of ISDS by the E.U.). 
 49 Memorandum from Gen. Secretariat of the Council of the European Union to Delegations 
12981/17 ADD 1 DCL 1, Negotiating Directives for a Convention Establishing a Multilateral 
Court for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (Mar. 1, 2018), http://data.consilium.europa.eu/
doc/document/ST-12981-2017-ADD-1-DCL-1/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/S2PR-Y24F]; see Joint 
Interpretative Instrument, supra note 15, at 3–5 (documenting an economic and trade agreement 
between Canada and the E.U. that includes investment protection and dispute resolution); Europe-
an Union Proposal for Investment Protection and Resolution of Investment Disputes: Transatlan-
tic Trade and Investment Partnership, Trade in Services, Investment and E-Commerce: Chapter 
II-Investment § 3 (Nov. 12, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_
153955.pdf [https://perma.cc/44ZB-P6GG]; Colin M. Brown, A Multilateral Mechanism for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes. Some Preliminary Sketches, 32 ICSID REV. 673, 682 (2017) 
(noting that the E.U. is currently engaging in talks on trade and investment protection agreements 
with countries including United States, Vietnam, Singapore, Japan, China and Mexico). See gen-
erally EU and Mexico Reach New Agreement on Trade, EUR. COMM’N: NEWS ARCHIVE (Apr. 21, 
2018), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1830 [https://perma.cc/5WCV-DWPK] 
(discussing a new trade agreement between Mexico and the E.U. that includes the EU’s new ICS); 
The EU and Vietnam Finalise Landmark Trade Deal, EUR. COMM’N: NEWS ARCHIVE (Dec. 2, 
2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1409 [https://perma.cc/FM9H-ESDM] 
(discussing final talks between Vietnam and the E.U. on a free trade agreement that will include 
an updated investment dispute resolution system). 
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FDI, and given that around half of the existing BITs involve E.U. member 
States, the E.U. exercises considerable leverage in challenging the status 
quo.50 Its support enhances the political possibility for a multilateral ICS.  
Although an investment court may seem better, there are reasons why 
States may not agree to this option. It may be remote from domestic stake-
holders and its decisions could be resisted on sovereignty grounds. Its deci-
sion-makers also could be beholden to powerful States given those States’ 
greater importance for the system’s sustainability. If those powerful States 
dislike the judges’ decisions, they could block their replacement and sus-
pend the court, as has happened in other venues such as the World Trade 
Organization. There may also be other reasons, including the cost of estab-
lishing and maintaining a permanent tribunal. 
The main point is that contexts differ across States, and choices should 
depend on those contexts and how States want to promote climate change 
conscious and sustainable FDI. Where basic rule-of-law norms are protected, 
the costs of an additional international system of review may not be worth-
while. Rather, reliance may be better placed on national courts. In contrast to 
a State that lacks independent, impartial courts, an international mechanism 
that provides for investor standing to bring claims is of much greater im-
portance. In some contexts, States may prefer not to include a system of ex-
haustion of local remedies to streamline the process. A State can then provide 
greater assurance to investors that they will be treated fairly, and thus reduce 
the State’s cost of capital. In this context, an ICS with an appellate mecha-
nism appears to be a superior model to ISDS because it would more likely be 
attentive to a State’s public policy interests, including the interests of other 
stakeholders in the investment process.  
Our Treaty does not dictate which institutional option is best across all 
contexts or through time. The goal of the Green Treaty in this respect is to pre-
sent different options with sufficient safeguards. These options will be a func-
tion of context and will depend on particular factors, including a State’s mar-
ket size and FDI dependence, per capita wealth, capital endowment, historical 
background, institutional development, and government ideology, et cetera. 
But looking forward, we believe that an international investment regime that 
is consistent with provisions to address climate change challenges likely can-
not simply rely on ISDS. Flexibility will likely be the trend since it will allow 
States facing distinct challenges to select from a menu of imperfect interna-
tional alternatives. 
                                                                                                                           
 50 European Commission State of the Union 2017: Factsheet on Future Negotiations for a Multi-
lateral Investment Court, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/september/tradoc_156042.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EP22-ZJPN] [hereinafter European Commission Factsheet]. 
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B. Transparency and the Enhancement of International Dispute Settlement 
The three proposed alternatives could be strengthened to increase en-
forceability. The alternative of using domestic courts, for instance, can be 
affected by long delays not uncommon in domestic legal proceedings.51 
Hence, the Green Treaty proposes strengthening the alternatives by a re-
quirement that any such case be decided in an expeditious manner that pro-
vides due process.52 Other alternatives exist to improve domestic enforce-
ment, including relying on a system of preliminary reference whereby do-
mestic adjudicators can refer questions of interpretation to international tri-
bunals. The advantage of the preliminary reference alternative is its focus 
on enhancing the rule of law within States, as opposed to bypassing them. If 
effective, the international court’s reach is extended in an efficient and legit-
imate manner. The disadvantage, from the perspective of investors, is that 
they have no direct access to an international body, but rather depend on the 
good faith of national courts, which act as gatekeepers. The international 
body can only respond to questions as framed by the national courts. The 
system thus depends on whether national courts have incentives to refer 
matters to the international body. To the extent that they lack such incen-
tives, as they do in many domestic contexts, this alternative would likely be 
ineffective. It could, however, be complemented by other mechanisms, such 
as an interstate dispute settlement. 
The investor-State and standing tribunal alternatives can be strength-
ened in three major ways as proposed by the Green Treaty. First, by provid-
ing an enhanced Code of Conduct, which should lead to more just deci-
sions, reduce post-award complaints, and increase the credibility of the pro-
cess.53 Second, the Treaty requires the application of the UNCITRAL Rules 
on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration, which has 
many advantages, including increasing credibility, allowing public input 
that may be helpful, and informing the public about what countries must do 
to comply with awards.54 And third, the Green Treaty implicitly requires 
                                                                                                                           
 51 See JONATHAN BONNITCHA ET AL., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE INVESTMENT TREA-
TY REGIME 90 (2017) (noting that the 3.6 year timeframe for an ICSID arbitration is “more than 
twice the duration for litigation in domestic courts in selected developed countries”); Anthony 
Sinclair, ICSID Arbitration: How Long Does It Take?, 4 GLOBAL ARB. REV. 5, 19 (2009) (report-
ing that the average length of an ICSID arbitration is 3.6 years). 
 52 Green Treaty: Team Planet, supra note 8, art. 39.  
 53 Id. annex 38-B-1/38-C-1. 
 54 Id. art. 39; see U.N. Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitra-
tion, art. 2, opened for signature Mar. 17, 2015, 54 I.L.M 4 (entered into force Oct. 18, 2017) 
(providing for the implementation of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency); Rep. of the U.N. 
Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law on the Work of Its Forty-Sixth Session, at 81–86, U.N. Doc. A/68/17 
 
2018] Greening Investor-State Dispute Settlement 2731 
countries to report on compliance with awards and settlements as part of 
their analysis of the impacts of FDI on climate change.55 We conclude this 
section with an elaboration of such provisions. 
• Enhanced Expertise of Arbitrators: The Green Treaty proposes 
that members of international tribunals (the second and third 
dispute settlement options) have a basic knowledge not only of 
investment law but also of climate change law and of sustain-
able development law and policy. Few international arbitrators 
now possess such expertise, which is essential to adjudicating 
issues relating to climate change and which can be gained 
without undue effort. If this provision becomes effective, it is 
predictable that major academic institutions interested in arbi-
tration will hold short courses to provide such training, proba-
bly partly or wholly online.56 Relatedly, the Green Treaty ex-
pressly authorizes international tribunals to engage experts to 
provide expertise that may be needed in a particular case, such 
as the sufficiency of a party’s environmental management pro-
gram. As described below, the Treaty specifies that the UN-
CITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-
State Arbitrations apply to ensure that the public is informed 
of disputes, including relating to climate change, and to in-
crease the credibility of dispute settlement.57 
• Code of Conduct: The Green Treaty includes a Code of Con-
duct for Arbitrators that applies to all international dispute res-
olution mechanisms, including mediation. The Code is signifi-
cantly more detailed than the few existing codes, and it is 
mandatory. In addition to general duties of the arbitrators, the 
                                                                                                                           
(2013) (supplying the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency) [hereinafter U.N. Comm’n Int’l Trade 
Law 46th]. 
 55 Green Treaty: Team Planet, supra note 8, art. 28. 
 56 For a larger discussion and an explanation of different forms of bias in ISDS, see Sergio 
Puig, Blinding International Justice, 56 VA. J. INT’L L. 647, 661–62, 672–5 (2016) and Chiara 
Giorgetti, Who Decides Who Decides in International Investment Arbitration?, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L 
L. 431, 436–37 (2013) (discussing the criticisms for lack of diversity in arbitrator selection). 
 57 U.N. Comm’n Int’l Trade Law 46th, supra note 54, at 81–86 (supplying the UNCITRAL 
Rules on Transparency); Green Treaty: Team Planet, supra note 8, art. 39; see Malcolm Langford 
et al., The Revolving Door in International Investment Arbitration, 20 J. INT’L ECON. L. 301, 324–
27 (2017) (providing empirical evidence of a significant group of individuals who sequentially or 
simultaneously perform different roles in international investment arbitration cases, creating cred-
ibility issues for their resulting decisions); Nassib G. Ziadé, How Many Hats Can a Player Wear: 
Arbitrator, Counsel and Expert?, 24 ICSID REV. 49, 50–58 (2009) (discussing conflict scenarios 
when an international investment dispute arbitrator has another relationship to the subject matter 
of the dispute, such as acting as counsel on a prior case with similar issues). 
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Code uniquely provides for specific duties and obligations in 
all the phases of the arbitral proceedings. Duties are owed to 
both parties and other arbitrators. Significantly, the Code also 
details specific issues to be disclosed, which include past and 
pending appointments and work as counsel as well as conflict 
of interest.58 
• Transparency: The Green Treaty requires that the UNCITRAL 
Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitra-
tions be used in all international dispute resolution mecha-
nisms identified in the Treaty. These rules were recently nego-
tiated in UNCITRAL and represent a balanced and workable 
set of rules that recognizes the important functions served by 
transparency in this context. Considering both the transparen-
cy requirements and the Code of Conduct, we believe the 
Treaty is responsive to recent criticisms of ISDS to the effect 
that the arbitral process lacks transparency and clear rules of 
procedure.59 
C. UNCITRAL and the Opportunity for Substantive Reform60 
There is an unprecedented process of reform of international invest-
ment law underway. This process has largely been in response to the cri-
tiques of ISDS. States and commentators have proposed a range of institu-
tional reforms that are being discussed in a UNCITRAL working group.61 
Prominently, the E.U. has promoted a multilateral investment court system 
where private investors retain standing to file claims directly against 
                                                                                                                           
 58 Green Treaty: Team Planet, supra note 8, annex 38-B-1/38-C-1; Catherine A. Rogers, Fit 
and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct for International Arbitration, 23 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 341, 422 (2002) (proposing “articulated, enforceable ethical norms” in ISDS). 
 59 U.N. Comm’n Int’l Trade Law 46th, supra note 54, at 81–86; Green Treaty: Team Planet, 
supra note 8, art. 39. See generally U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Working Group II (Arbitra-
tion and Conciliation), Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Preparation of a Legal Standard on 
Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration, Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.172 (Aug. 2, 2012) (constructing the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency); 
U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation), Settlement of 
Commercial Disputes: Preparation of a Legal Standard on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-
State Arbitration, Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.169 (Dec. 13, 2011) 
(constructing the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency). 
 60 For a more in-depth analysis, see Professor Puig’s previous scholarship published in the 
American Journal of International Law. See generally Puig & Shaffer, supra note 35. 
 61 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law: Working Grp. II (Dispute Resolution), Annotated Provi-
sional Agenda of the Sixty-Eighth Session, at 2–3, U.N Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.204 (Nov. 22, 
2017). See generally Roberts, Clash of Paradigms, supra note 47. 
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States.62 The E.U. has already concluded agreements containing such a sys-
tem—designed for bilateral relations, but including flexibilities for multilat-
eralization—with Canada, Singapore, Vietnam and Mexico, and indications 
are that more agreements with these features will follow.63 As noted above, 
the E.U. exercises considerable leverage in this reform process due to its 
role as a leading sender and receiver of FDI and the multitude of existing 
IIAs that involve E.U. members.64  
In parallel, India adopted a new model BIT incorporating ISDS, but 
conditioned its use on the initial pursuit of remedies before domestic courts 
for at least five years.65 India and China also have signaled interest in an ap-
pellate process, similar to that included in the E.U.’s proposal.66 Although the 
United States has previously defended ISDS, in October 2017, Robert 
Lighthizer, the United States Trade Representative (USTR), signaled a poten-
tial shift in the United States’ position regarding ISDS, suggesting that inves-
tors should rely on market mechanisms, such as political risk insurance.67 In 
this context, the ICSID Secretariat also has advanced consideration of an ‘in-
cremental’ updating of the ICSID Regulations and Rules.68  
So far, the UNCITRAL process has focused on international dispute 
settlement provisions. To some extent, this focus is understandable given 
the attention that ISDS attracts among international law practitioners, legal 
                                                                                                                           
 62 See, e.g., European Commission Factsheet, supra note 50. 
 63 See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing the EU’s promotion of ICS in recent 
investment protections and trade treaty negotiations). 
 64 European Commission Factsheet, supra note 50; see Anthea Roberts, A Turning of the Tide 
Against ISDS?, EJIL TALK! (May 19, 2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/a-turning-of-the-tide-against-
isds/ [https://perma.cc/73HW-3EG7] (listing examples of proposed reforms); see also U.N. CONFER-
ENCE ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2015: REFORMING INTERNATIONAL IN-
VESTMENT GOVERNANCE 4, 7, 111, http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N7RR-FYGR] (providing a global overview of FDI and evolving IIAs). 
 65 Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 15.2 (Gov’t of the Republic of 
India 2015), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3560 [https://perma.cc/
LST3-USYW]. 
 66 See Gregory Shaffer & Henry Gao, China’s Rise: How It Took on the U.S. at the WTO, U. 
ILL. L. REV. 115, 157 n.321 (2018) (“[S]ome Chinese trade specialists believe that China could 
look favorably on an appellate process for investor-state dispute settlement.”); Roberts, Reform of 
Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 10, at 33 (“China could well become a semi-systemic re-
former, seeking to retain investment treaty arbitration . . . but subject to an appellate body.”). 
 67 Shawn Donnan, Bitter Differences over Nafta Break into the Open, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 18, 
2017), https://www.ft.com/content/058aa538-b387-11e7-a398-73d59db9e399 (“Mr. Lighthizer 
. . . said the [ISDS] system amounted to an unfair subsidy for businesses to invest overseas. ‘Why 
is it [Mr. Lighthizer’s] job to encourage people to invest in Mexico?’”). 
 68 Other proposals exist. See Roberts, Reform of Investor-State Arbitration, supra note 10, at 10–
11; see also Invitation to File Suggestions for Rule Amendments, News Release, INT’L CTR. FOR 
SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, (Jan. 25, 2017), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/News.aspx?
CID=213 [https://perma.cc/NM8K-3DCC]. 
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scholars, and civil society organizations. But the problems with the interna-
tional investment regime are deeper and should respond to bigger, more 
relevant issues such as climate change. This is necessary in part (or because 
of) its neocolonial roots that focus on FDI protection in resource-intensive 
sectors that require large upfront capital, especially in the petroleum extrac-
tion sector. Hence, the reform process presents a unique opportunity to cre-
ate a real transformation to produce an investment law regime more con-
sistent with the main challenges now facing human society. 
CONCLUSION 
The Paris Agreement on climate change reached in December 2015 
was a historic achievement in international diplomacy. Climate change, like 
widespread poverty and inequality, nuclear proliferation, and the threats of a 
global pandemic, poses tremendous threats to individuals and human socie-
ty—threats that are being experienced now around the world while interna-
tional efforts to address climate change continue to remain inadequate. 
Massive amounts of capital, carefully planned and effectively implemented 
projects, and international cooperation and coordination involving all stake-
holders are needed to combat climate change. The current process of inter-
national investment law reform can be used to scale-up this ambition by 
greening IIAs. Changes required to existing models include requiring all 
arbitrators to be familiar with climate change and sustainable development 
law and policy, instituting a mandatory Code of Conduct, and increasing 
transparency and the opportunity for public participation. The Green Treaty 
discussed in this Essay presents a dyna mic path to achieving these goals, 
and to building a better tomorrow for present and future generations by im-
proving the provisions and the dispute settlement process currently domi-
nant in most investment treaties. 
